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criminator to be a member of one of the classes in the Act, the discriminator's
intent should be controlling. If the discriminator refused to serve a man he be-
lieved to be black, the intent of the discriminator to refuse service on the basis
of race should be sufficient to invoke the Civil Rights Act of 1964, whether the
man was actually black or not. Brogan believed the plaintiffs were antichristian
and atheistic, even though they were not. In that circumstance, can it be denied
that Brogan refused service to the plaintiffs on the basis of religion? The statu-
tory language can easily accept such an interpretation. It is within the broad
policy scope of the Act to include discriminations based on the characteristics
of the person being discriminated against. Situations in which the intent of the
discriminator is to refuse service because he believes, even though erroneously,
the person has characteristics of one of the classes provided in the Act should
be included within the Act as well.
Mark C. Clements
Why Bastard, Wherefore Base?
Ezra Vincent died intestate, survived by his illegitimate daughter, Rita,
and several collateral relations. Rita's claim as sole heir to her father's estate
was supported by conclusive proof that she was the child of Ezra Vincent.! The
trial court applied Louisiana intestate succession statutes' and concluded that
Ezra Vincent's collateral relations were his only lawful heirs. The Louisiana
Court of Appeals affirmed,4 and the Supreme Court of Louisiana denied certio-
rari.' On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Rita contended that
Louisiana's statutory scheme for intestate succession constituted an invidious
discrimination against illegitimate children which was violative of the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.' Held, af-
firmed: The Louisiana intestate succession provisions which preclude illegiti-
mate children, even though duly acknowledged, from claiming the succession
rights of legitimate children, were choices within the power of the state to
'The complete Shakespearean quotation is: "Why bastard, wherefore base? When my
dimensions are as well compact, my mind as generous, and my shape as true, as honest
madam's issue? Why brand they us with base? with baseness? bastardy? base, base?" W.
SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act I, scene 2, lines 6-10.
' Rita's birth certificate established that she was the child of Ezra Vincent and Lou Bertha
Patterson (now Labine). Decedent and Lou Bertha Patterson appeared before a notary
public and executed an acknowledgement of paternity as to Rita, elevating her to the status
of a "natural child." See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 202 (West 1952). Rita's birth certificate
was changed to give her decedent's name one month after the acknowledgement. However,
this appears to be directed only when the child has been legitimated by subsequent marriage
of its parents. See LA. REV. STAT. § 40:308 (1965). The brothers and sisters came from
as far away as Washington, D.C. They were unable to prove that their parents had ever
been married, and they could prove their relationship to the decedent only by reputation.
3 "Natural children are called to the inheritance of their natural father, who has duly
acknowledged them, when he has left no descendents nor ascendents, nor collateral relations,
nor surviving wife, and to the exclusion only of the state." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 909
(West 1952).
' Succession of Vincent, 229 So. 2d 449 (La. Ct. App. 1969).
' 255 La. 480, 231 So. 2d 395 (1970).6 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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make, and are not in contravention of the due process or equal protection
clauses. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
I. INTESTATE SUCCESSION AND THE ILLEGITIMATE
It is within the power of each state to provide for the devolution of property
of its citizens on intestacy Statutory schemes for intestate succession vary wide-
ly, but generally legitimate children and their descendants are preferred over
illegitimate children." This preference has its origin in the common law which
considered the illegitimate as nullius filius, a kin to nobody, unable to inherit
from his parents or other ancestors Any deviation from the common-law pro-
visions for descent and distribution must be by statute. Therefore, illegitimate
children have no succession rights in the absence of contrary legislation." Juris-
dictions following civil-law principles allow illegitimates to inherit only from
their mothers.11
Louisiana's legal traditions are derived from the French, Spanish, and Roman
civil law, and the Louisiana Constitution reflects the extensive legal ordering of
familial affairs characteristic of the civil law."' Louisiana has classified those
who may inherit in terms of their legal rather than their biological relation to
the deceased. Mothers may inherit from their illegitimate children whom they
have acknowledged, and vice versa." However, Louisiana law takes a stricter
course as regards the relationship between father and illegitimate child. The
illegitimate child that goes unacknowledged is termed a "bastard"" and inherits
nothing from his father. An acknowledgment entitles him to be termed a "nat-
ural child,1.. and he may inherit from his father, but only to the exclusion of
the state. The only way an illegitimate can attain equality with his legitimate
siblings is to be "legitimated"; 8 then he may take by intestate succession or by
will as any other child.
7 Harris v. Zion's Say. Bank & Trust Co., 317 U.S. 447, 450 (1943); Mager v. Grima,
49 U.S. (8 How.) 490, 493 (1850).
' For a compilation of statutory schemes of intestate succession, see Note, Constitutional
Law-Equal Protection of Illegitimate Children, 17 LOYOLA L. REV. 170, 172 n.8
(1970-7 1).
9See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *446.
"
0 See Annot., 24 A.L.R. 570, 571-92 (1923); Annot., 83 A.L.R. 1330, 1331-38 (1933).
" Oppenheim, One Hundred Fifty Years of Succession Law, 33 TUL. L. REV. 43, 46
(1958).
12 See Tucker, Sources of Louisiana's Law of Persons: Blackstone, Domat, and the French
Codes, 44 TUL. L. REV. 264 (1970).
13Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 79 (1968) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting). Apart from inheritance, the Louisiana legislators have been reluctant to classify
on the basis of a citizen's legitimacy. Louisiana makes no distinction between legitimate and
illegitimate children for the crime of incest. LA. REv. STAT. § 14:78 (1952). A mother
has the right to sue for the loss of property destroyed during the life of her illegitimate
son if he dies thereafter. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. arts. 2315 (West 1952), 922 (West Supp.
1967). Furthermore, a mother is eligible for recovery under Louisiana's Workmen's Com-
pensation Act if she is the dependent of her illegitimate son killed in an industrial accident
at his place of employment. Thompson v. Vestal Lumber & Mfg. Co., 208 La. 83, 119, 22
So. 2d 842, 854 (1945); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 23:1231, :1252, :1253 (1964).14LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 918, 922 (West 1952).
1 Id. art. 202.
16Id.
" See note 3 supra.
18 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1486 (West 1952). Legitimation is effected by the subse-
quent marriage of the biological parents of the illegitimate.
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The Louisiana courts have stated that the classification of children as legiti-
mate or illegitimate for purposes of intestate succession serves a valid legisla-
tive purpose. The classification seeks to encourage the institution of marriage,
discourage the birth of illegitimate children, and promote security of title to
property. 9 The rationale behind the classification is "not to punish the offspring
of those contravening these rules of morality, but to raise a warning barrier
before the transgressor, prior to the act, of the consequences of his con-
duct ... "
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE CLASSIFICATIONS
The United States Supreme Court decided in 1850 that every state has the
power to regulate "the manner and term upon which property... may be trans-
mitted by last will and testament, or by inheritance; and of prescribing who
shall and who shall not be capable of taking it."" This power is not altogether
exclusive," and even though a state is not obligated to extend a right to any-
one, once it has done so, it must not limit the extended right by making un-
reasonable distinctions."
The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution demands that
a state afford its citizens equal protection of the laws.' Great latitude is given
to state legislatures in making classifications incident to social and economic
legislation." It has been stated by the Supreme Court that the scope of particu-
lar legislation need not provide "abstract symmetry."'" The legislatures may
mark and set aside the classes and types of problems according to the needs of
the state and as dictated or suggested by experience. Nevertheless, a state may
not invidiously discriminate between particular classes of persons.' Historical
notions of equality have not limited the interpretation of what is invidious
discrimination, 9 for equal protection of the laws defies exact interpretation."0
The traditional standard in applying the equal protection clause calls for an
" Strahan v. Strahan, 304 F. Supp. 40, 42-44 (W.D. La. 1969).
'
0Minor v. Young, 149 La. 583, 589, 89 So. 757, 759 (1921).
"Mager v. Grima, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 490, 493 (1850). See also Irving Trust Co. v.
Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1941).
" "Although it is true that this [devolution of property] is an area normally left to the
states, it is not immune under the Tenth Amendment from laws passed by the Federal Gov-
ernment which are, as is the law here, necessary and proper to the exercise of a delegated
power." United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 649 (1961).
"Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
21 "No state shall .. .deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The guaranty of "equal protection of the laws is
a pledge of the protection of equal laws." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
21See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
21Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 144 (1914).
"2New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928). See also Tigner v.
Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940) ("The Constitution does not require things which are
different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same."); Bain Pea-
nut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501 (1931) ("[Tlhe machinery of government would
not work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints."); and Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S.
33, 43 (1915) (the legislature is not prevented from recognizing "degrees of evil").
21 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942).
2Ssee, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), in which the Court reversed
the holding of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), that state maintenance of separate
public facilities for white and Negro citizens was constitutional.
'Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 TJ,S. 32, 37 (1928),
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examination of the relationship between the discrimination and the purpose of
the legislature's activity."' The ultimate inquiry for the Court is whether the
legislative action treats all persons similarly situated without arbitrary or un-
reasonable distinctions." A law is reasonable under the equal protection clause
only if the consideration of difference which separates those persons or things
excluded from those included in the class has a fair and substantial relationship
to the purpose of the legislation.'
The traditional standard for application of the equal protection clause was
one of limited judicial scrutiny. A stricter standard, known as the "compelling
interest" doctrine, was articulated in 19 660 This "compelling interest" excep-
tion requires that classifications based on "suspect" criteria or affecting a "funda-
mental right" be supported by a compelling interest.' Classifications involving
one or both of these factors are subject to the "most rigid scrutiny."'3 Among
those interests identified by the Court as "fundamental" are: voting," procrea-
tion," association for political purposes,"9 and interstate travel." Race is the
only criterion that is definitely suspect,41 although others may be nationality42
and alienage. The Supreme Court has not said whether classification on the
basis of legitimacy is similarly suspect." However, it has been suggested that
the common factor in all these suspect classifications is that they discriminate
against an individual on the basis of factors over which he has no control.'
A higher degree of relevance to legislative purpose is required of classifica-
tions involving a fundamental right or suspect criteria. Because discrimination
based upon a fundamental right or suspect criteria can survive constitutional
attack only with the demonstration of a compelling interest, such classifications
1 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964); Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37 (1928); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415(1920).
" See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-57 (1963); Central R.R. v. Pennsyl-
vania, 370 U.S. 607, 617-18 (1962); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465-66 (1957); Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17-19 (1956); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954);
Kotch v. Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556-57 (1947); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Wil-
liamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541-43 (1941); Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v.
Harrison, 301 U.S. 459, 461-63 (1937); Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 227 U.S.
32, 37-39 (1928); Air-Way Elec. & Appliance Corp. v. Day, 266 U.S. 71, 85 (1924);
F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); Southern Ry. v. Greene,
216 U.S. 400, 417 (1910); American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 92 (1900);
Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155 (1897).
" Asbury Hosp. v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207, 214 (1945); Skinner v. Oklahoma cx
rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 543 (1942); Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Dis-
tillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 197 (1936); State Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 537
(1931); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
'Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
"' Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
3"Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
" See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
" Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (semble).
"Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
40Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).4
'See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
'See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944).4 3See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948).
'But see Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
4' Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 551 n.19 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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are not usually upheld. " This result occurs because the ordinary presumption of
validity is reversed when a suspect criterion or fundamental right classification
is discovered. ' In such cases the burden shifts, and the state then has the burden
of justifying the legislation."
III. LABINE V. VINCENT
In Labine v. Vincent"9 the United States Supreme Court declined to examine
the Louisiana intestate succession laws as they pertain to illegitimates in light
of the equal protection clause. Instead, the Court merely reaffirmed the exclu-
sive power of every state to regulate the devolution of property." The opinion
in Labine concluded with an observation that Louisiana had not created an in-
surmountable barrier to the decedent's illegitimate daughter." No such barrier
existed because Ezra Vincent could have made a will, legitimated Rita by mar-
rying her mother, or made a statement of his intent to legitimate Rita."'
The Court has not declined in prior cases to apply the equal protection clause
to a subject merely because it is regulable by the States.63 The Court's action is
especially surprising in light of the 1968 companion decisions of Levy v. Louisi-
ana and Glona v. American Guaranty & Liability Insurance Co.,' in which
Mr. Justice Douglas used language that several writers?' believed would place
illegitimacy on the growing list of suspect criteria: "[IUt is invidious to dis-
criminate against them [illegitimates] when no action, conduct or demeanor of
theirs is possibly relevant to the harm that was done the mother."' However,
it is clear now that Levy and Glona are not based on a finding of "suspect"
classification. Instead, Levy and Glona called for an application of the tradi-
tional "rational basis" test. 8 On first impression it appears that neither test was
applied in Labine. However, the majority opinion in Labine suggests by way of
a footnote that the Louisiana intestate succession statute is subject to the less
46See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23 (1968).
47 See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Madden v. Kentucky,
309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).
"'Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
4401 U.S. 532 (1971).
"Justice Black, writing for the majority, alluded to the Court's previous holdings in
Mager v. Grima, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 490, 493 (1850), and Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188,
193 (1938). But see his opinion in United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 649 (1961),
in which he asserted that the states are not immune from review of laws pertaining to the
devolution of property.
" The Court attempted to distinguish Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), on the
ground that in Levy Louisiana had created an insurmountable barrier by their wrongful
death statute which barred an illegitimate child from recovering for the wrongful death of
its mother.
52401 U.S. at 533.
"See note 50 supra.
34391 U.S. 68 (1968) (an illegitimate child may bring an action for the wrongful
death of his mother, despite a state statute to the contrary).
55391 U.S. 73 (1968) (a mother may bring an action for the wrongful death of her
illegitimate child, despite a state statute to the contrary).
" See, e.g., In re Estate of Jensen, 162 N.W.2d 861, 878 (N.D. 1968); Note, Constitu-
tional Law-Equal Protection of Illegitimate Children, 17 LOYOLA L. REV. 170 (1971);
Note, Successions-Illegitimacy-Equal Protection and the Applicability of Levy v. Louisiana
to Succession Law, 44 TUL. L. REv. 640 (1970); 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 292 (1970).
57 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).




stringent rational basis test. 9 One must assume that the rational basis for the
Louisiana law was too apparent to the Court to warrant discussion."0
Analysis of Louisiana's intestate succession statute in light of the equal pro-
tection clause raises two questions. First, does the basis for Louisiana's classifi-
cation of those who take upon intestacy have a fair and substantial relation to a
valid legislative objective? And second, if the first inquiry results in a finding of
reasonableness, then is the distinction one which is suspect or one which in-
volves a fundamental right?"1
Louisiana has chosen to distinguish those classes of persons who shall take
upon intestacy in terms of their legal rather than their biological relation to
the deceased. Acknowledged illegitimates take only to the exclusion of the
state, while "bastards" take nothing. In view of the usual objective of intestacy
statutes to distribute the intestate's property as he most likely would have done
had he drawn a will,"' the distinction of legal relationship becomes slightly
unrealistic. The distinction is wholly unrealistic when applied to the acknow-
ledged illegitimate who has a strong relationship with his parents. A more justi-
fiable distinction would favor those children who could prove a biological re-
lationship, the parent's financial support, and the parent's love and affection,
rather than those who could prove merely a biological relationship."
It has been stated in support of the Louisiana intestate statute that a classifi-
cation on the basis of legitimacy is reasonable because its effect bears a sub-
stantial relation to a legitimate legislative purpose. The law is said to encourage
marriage, discourage promiscuity, and stabilize land titles. While the first two
purposes may be morally desirable, the legislative disabilities imposed upon
the illegitimate child have not had a prophylactic effect upon the illicit conduct
of the parents." Very little "reasonableness" lies in penalizing the child for the
sins of the parents.
Protecting heirs or purchasers of the intestate's property from individuals
who might fraudulently pose as illegitimate offspring is also desirable. Re-
quiring the demonstration of a legal relationship between the child and the
deceased parent appears reasonable to provide such protection. However, the
"'401 U.S. 533 n.6 (1971): "Even if we were to apply the 'rational basis' test to the
Louisiana intestate succession statute, that statute clearly has a rational basis in view of Louisi-
ana's interest in promoting family life and of directing the disposition of property left with-
in the State."
6
" Justice Harlan's concurrence concluded that it is "[e]ntirely reasonable for Louisiana
to provide that a man who has entered into a marital relationship thereby undertakes obliga-
tions to any resulting offspring beyond those which he owes to the product of a casual
liaison." 401 U.S. 532, 540 (1971).
61 Since the finding of a suspect classification or the infringement of a fundamental right
has the effect of reversing the usual presumption of validity, the second inquiry is usually
the first one to be considered.
62Comment, Status of Illegitimates in Louisiana, 16 LOYOLA L. REV. 87, 109 (1969).
6" This distinction would be contrary to Louisiana's forced heirship right of legitimate
children. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1493-95 (West 1952). But all of Louisiana's distinc-
tions in ordering of familial relations must be considered when determining a justifiable
classification.6 4 See, e.g., Krause, Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy v. Louisiana-First
Decisions on Equal Protection and Paternity, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 338, 347 (1969). In 1940,
89,500 illegitimate children were born as compared with 318,100 illegitimate births in
1967. In 1940 the rate of illegitimacy per 1,000 unmarried women was 7.1 as compared
with a rate of 24.0 in 1967. In 1940 the ratio of illegitimates born per 1,000 live births was
37.9 as compared with a ratio of 90.3 in 1967. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION &
WELFARE, VITAL STATISTICS OF THE U,S. 1967, table 25, § 1 (1969).
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statute which discriminates against the "natural child," the acknowledged but
unlegitimated offspring, is not justifiable on these grounds. Louisiana land titles
are not jeopardized if an illegitimate child must be acknowledged in writing
before a notary in order to take on intestacy. These requirements would provide
more security to land titles than would the fact of legitimate birth.e' Hence, it
seems completely unreasonable to discriminate between the acknowledged il-
legitimate and the legitimate child for the purpose of securing land titles. In
Rita Vincent's case the state's discrimination between legitimate and natural
children to support title security seems completely arbitrary.
By giving every presumption of validity to the state's classification, the ques-
tion of reasonableness could, however, be answered affirmatively. Even assum-
ing that the stabilization of land titles is in no way promoted by distinguishing
between legitimate children and acknowledged illegitimates for purposes of in-
testate succession, the Louisiana law probably meets the reasonableness stan-
dard. In view of the Court's unwillingness to strike down legislation so long as
any measure of reasonableness can be shown, one must assume that if the
Louisiana succession laws deter one illegitimate birth, or encourage one couple
to marry, the law is rationally related to some legitimate legislative purpose.
The next step is to inquire into the possibility of the status involving a sus-
pect classification or fundamental right. The question of the existence of a fun-
damental right to inherit on intestacy may be easily dismissed. The Court has
not found the "right" to be a fundamental one. An inspection into the suspect
nature of a classification based on legitimacy is not so easily resolved. Classifi-
cations which have been declared suspect appear to have been based on con-
genital or unalterable traits over which an individual has no control and for
which he should not be held responsible. Though important, these considera-
tions do not completely explain the character of suspect criteria. Classifications
based on race or lineage will usually be perceived as a stigma of inferiority and
a badge of ignominy." It therefore appears that the attachment of ignominy to
a particular classification is the key to the determination of what future con-
genital and unalterable traits will be viewed as suspect. 7 Illegitimacy of birth,
The following standards have been suggested to meet the test of reasonableness for
proving requisite family relationships. In order to prove maternity, possession, and presen-
tation of a valid birth certificate bearing the names of the mother and child must be pro-
duced; testimony must be given to the effect that the child was dependent upon, supported
by, and lived with the mother and was reputed to be the child of the alleged mother; or
testimony must be given to the effect that the mother lived with and was dependent upon
the child, and was reputed to be the mother of the alleged child. In order to prove paternity,
it has been suggested that the requirements established by the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 416(h) (3) (A) (i)-(ii) (Supp. I, 1965), serve as a format. This being the case, the child
should: (1) be acknowledged in writing by the father; (2) be decreed or ordered the
father's child by the court; or (3) produce other evidence satisfying the court that this is
the father of the child and that he has been living with or contributing to the child's sup-
port. 43 TUL. L. REv. 383, 388 nn.16, 17 (1969).
As a further safeguard to the stability of land titles, a statute of limitations could be
established limiting the time within which the illegitimate might bring his claim; i.e., the
illegitimate could be required to establish paternity within the father's lifetime or a reason-
able time thereafter.
'" Cf. Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 424 (1960)
(the social meaning of segregation is inequality, the stamping of one race with the mark
of inferiority).
" For example, congenital blindness is an unalterable trait, but is not viewed as suspect
because the stigma is not despicable.
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under this formulation is a prime candidate for being a suspect trait."8 Once a
characterizing trait is found to be suspect, the state must overcome the pre-
sumptive invalidity of the classification and show a compelling justification.
Louisiana's stated purposes were barely sufficent to support a finding of reason-
ableness and would surely fall under the rigid scrutiny of the compelling in-
terest test. Nevertheless, the Court has yet to place illegitimacy on the list of
suspect criteria.
IV. CONCLUSION
The failure of the majority to more thoroughly analyze Louisiana's classifi-
cation is untenable when considered in light of preceding cases. By evading the
issue of discrimination, the decision is a definite backward step in developing
the application of the equal protection clause. Concededly, the illegitimate may
never achieve social equality with the legitimate, and perhaps such equality is
not called for. However, the illegitimate has the right under the United States
Constitution to equal protection of the laws. An ancillary right is to have any
alleged discriminatory classification reviewed by the courts under standards
consistent with their previous holdings. A more principled decision, as suggest-
ed by Justice Brennan in his dissent, 9 would have been an analysis of whether
a rational basis existed and if such a basis was found, then an inspection of
illegitimacy as a possibly suspect trait. Until the questions posed by an appli-
cation of the equal protection guarantee to classifications based on legitimacy
are thoughtfully considered, one can do no more than Shakespeare's Edward
and wonder: "Why brand they us with base?" '
William J. Ruhe, Jr.
"See In re Estate of Jensen, 162 N.W.2d 861, 878 (N.D. 1968): "This statute [classi-
fying illegitimates as nontakers in inheritance], which punishes innocent children for their
arents' transgressions has no place in our system of government which has as one of its
asic tenets equal protection for all."
69401 U.S. 532, 548-49 (1971).
" $ee note 1 supra, .at line 1Q,
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